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1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Post Mortem of NIS Production for 1953

ANSWERED

1. The IAC considered the matter of doing post mortems of MIR's on 22 May 1932. The record of action is as follows:

"General Smith stated that the identification of intelligence deficiencies in our production, including the conduct of post mortems on estimates, was an essential part of the intelligence process. It was agreed that the IAC representatives should proceed to produce jointly statements of intelligence deficiencies on estimates in appropriate cases. Statements of intelligence deficiencies will be sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to members of the IAC for appropriate action."

- See also C

2. Based on that record of action, OMS issued a procedure which was followed during 1952 and early 1953: several post mortems were held on individual important estimates.

3. It then became apparent that to avoid repetition, estimates dealing with a particular region had to be considered together rather than separately. We therefore decided to experiment with a post mortem on the whale of the 1953 predation.

SUDOSTAIC

4. The agencies are generally content with the present draft though it is all too apparent that they only reluctantly associate themselves with any document that suggests that the intelligence effort is in any manner less than perfect.

5. Specific objections taken by the Air Force and the Army are footnoted in the text.

- B. The Air Force representative took the position that it was inappropriate to state that "An improvement

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In the liaison between operational and intelligence establish... would result in too mere timely receipt of intelligence".

SOURCE: Any suggestion which could lead to the production of better estimates is appropriate to note.

b. The Air Force representative objected to the breakdown and in parts of the section on the Soviet Bloc, preferring to lump these under one general "military" category (see ~~as so so~~ on p. 3 of text).

SOURCE: While the present arrangement perhaps highlights air matters in this case, as a general proposition the more specific we can be in identifying categories of subjects about which we need to know more, the more useful will our statement be as a guide for corrective action.


c. The G-2 representative objected to the reference on page 6, which states that we encountered a deficiency in PBM intelligence on Khrushchev's intentions and capabilities during the preparation of NS-48. He rested his case on the grounds that G-2 had in fact obtained a C-3 PBM field judgment in time to serve as a contribution to NS-48.

SOURCE: The fact that it was necessary to go to the field and that the contribution received, however useful, still left some questions unanswered is in the opinion of the other agencies sufficient grounds for leaving this in the text.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN PROCEDURE

6. All the agencies favor the recommended change in the procedure. The change calls for doing post mortem ~~quarterly~~. This will avoid the difficulties we encountered when using the estimate-by-estimate approach. It will also avoid the calling over of stale estimates which would be the result if the review were done less frequently than quarterly.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)
Acting Chairman

O/ME:PAR:11

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